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We outline a new multiple trace theory of temporal preparation (MTP), which accounts for
behavior in reaction time (RT) tasks in which the participant is presented with a warning
stimulus (S1) followed by a target stimulus (S2) that requires a speeded response. The
theory assumes that during the foreperiod (FP; the S1–S2 interval) inhibition is applied to
prevent premature response, while a wave of activation occurs upon the presentation of
S2. On each trial, these actions are stored in a separate memory trace, which, jointly with
earlier formed memory traces, starts contributing to preparation on subsequent trials.We
show that MTP accounts for classic effects in temporal preparation, including mean RT–
FP functions observed under a variety of FP distributions and asymmetric sequential
effects. We discuss the advantages of MTP over other accounts of these effects (trace-
conditioning and hazard-based explanations) and suggest a critical experiment to empirically
distinguish among them.
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INTRODUCTION
Timing the occurrence of future events is a fundamental abil-
ity that we routinely apply in a wide variety of activities, such
as driving a car, cooking a meal, jumping up to catch a ball, or
drawing up our daily agenda. In all these activities, we make
use of temporal contingencies that we have learned during our
lives and that we continuously update on the basis of new expe-
riences. For instance, we are reasonably accurate in predicting
when the trafﬁc light will turn green given the time that has
elapsed since we had to stop our car in front of it. If we have
to wait longer than we normally do, it is only a matter of seconds
before we start wondering whether the trafﬁc light might be out
of order. However, if the unexpected delay is due to a changed
phasing of the trafﬁc light, our subsequent exposures to it will
gradually bring our expectancies in sync again with the new time
regime.
Accurate timing is important because it may facilitate sev-
eral stages of information processing (Nobre and Coull, 2010)
across a wide variety of tasks, such as reaction time (RT)
tasks (e.g., Niemi and Näätänen, 1981), perceptual identiﬁca-
tion (e.g., Rolke, 2008; Rohenkohl et al., 2012; Vangkilde et al.,
2013), attentional selection (e.g., Yashar and Lamy, 2013; Seibold
and Rolke, 2014), temporal discrimination (e.g., Grondin and
Rammsayer, 2003; Los and Horoufchin, 2011), and time repro-
duction (e.g., Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010; Taatgen and Van Rijn,
2011). In the present article, we focus on timing processes in
the RT task, but our theoretical analysis may be revealing about
the nature of timing processes in other task domains as well,
since it ranges over general cognitive principles of learning and
memory.
In RT tasks, it has been shown that participants respond faster
to a target stimulus (S2) when it is preceded by a neutral warning
stimulus (S1; e.g., a brief sound) than when it is presented alone
(e.g., Niemi and Näätänen, 1981; Hackley, 2009). This old exper-
imental ﬁnding (e.g., Woodrow, 1914) has led to the postulation
of a process of temporal preparation1 that develops during the
foreperiod (FP), the interval between the offset of S1 and the
onset of S2. Research in which FP has been systematically var-
ied indicates that temporal preparation may develop very quickly
and reach an optimum in less than half a second (e.g., Müller-
Gethmann et al., 2003). However, the time course of temporal
preparation is by no means ﬁxed, as it is tuned by the FPs that
occurred on earlier trials during the experimental session. In par-
ticular, the development of temporal preparation during FPon any
given trial is modiﬁed both by the FPs occurring on the immedi-
ately preceding trials (a short-term effect; e.g., Los and Van den
Heuvel, 2001; Vallesi and Shallice, 2007) and by the wider con-
text of FPs in the experimental session (a long-term effect; e.g.,
Trillenberg et al., 2000; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005).
These effects suggest that temporal preparation is driven by two
mechanisms, operating at different time scales. Thus, Vallesi and
Shallice (2007) proposed a dual-processmodel, inwhich the short-
term effect is attributed to an automatic process and the long-term
effect to a controlled process. However, in this article we will show
that these effects, while having distinctive signatures, may still
proceed from a common implicit learning mechanism. The cen-
tral idea of our new multiple trace theory of temporal preparation
(MTP), is that both effects result from the joint activation of mem-
ory traces created on a trial-by-trial basis during an experimental
session. This multiple-trace conception has recently been success-
fully applied in the literature on time perception (Taatgen andVan
Rijn, 2011), and we will show that it is promising in explaining the
phenomena of temporal preparation, too.
In what follows, we ﬁrst describe a set of interrelated experi-
mental ﬁndings that we believe to be crucial to understanding the
processes underlying temporal preparation. Next, we discuss two
1The inferred process has also been called alertness, temporal attention, temporal
expectancy, non-speciﬁc preparation or simply preparation. The term temporal
preparation seems to be most frequent in the recent reaction time literature.
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fundamental explanatory constructs: the hazard function (e.g.,
Luce, 1986; Nobre et al., 2007) and trace conditioning (e.g., Los
and Van den Heuvel, 2001; Steinborn et al., 2009). It transpires
that the scope and limitations of these constructs are complemen-
tary. The hazard function is well equipped to deal with long-term
effects in temporal preparation, but fails to address the short-term
effects, while the situation is reversed for trace conditioning. Next,
we discuss Vallesi and Shallice’s (2007) dual-process model that
maintains a role for the hazard function and extends it with a
short-term component. Although this model accounts for many
of the reported ﬁndings, we will argue that it relies on disputable
assumptions. Then,weoutlineMTP,whichwedevelop as an exten-
sion of the trace-conditioning model. Finally, we evaluate MTP
and specify a possible empirical test.
A FAMILY OF PHENOMENA IN TEMPORAL PREPARATION
The phenomena of temporal preparation that we describe in this
section are all taken from RT tasks, in which participants are
instructed to prepare on the basis of S1 (a mere time marker, such
as a brief tone) and to respond as quickly as possible to S2. Across
these studies, strong, and consistent inﬂuences of FP duration and
FP context have been demonstrated, regardless of other details of
experimental design, such as the modality of S1 or S2 (e.g., audi-
tory or visual; e.g., Niemi and Näätänen, 1981; Müller-Gethmann
et al., 2003; Steinborn et al., 2009) or the task with respect to S2
(e.g., simple or choice; Niemi and Näätänen, 1981; Los and Van
den Heuvel, 2001; Müller-Gethmann et al., 2003).
As a standard experimental design, consider that FP is var-
ied at four possible levels, of 500, 1000, 1500, and 2000 ms (see
Figure 1, top panel for details). In the constant-FP paradigm,
these FPs are presented in separate blocks of trials, such that
FP remains constant within a block and varies between blocks.
In the variable-FP paradigm, FP is sampled on a trial-by-trial
basis from a certain distribution of FPs. For instance, in the
case of a uniform FP-distribution, each particular FP of our
standard design has a 1/4 probability of being sampled on each
trial. Furthermore, we deﬁne a possible moment of S2 pre-
sentation relative to the offset of S1 as a critical moment. The
moment that is used for the presentation of S2, on any par-
ticular trial, we deﬁne as the imperative moment of that trial.
That is, in the constant-FP paradigm, there is only one critical
moment, which is the imperative moment on each trial. In the
variable-FP paradigm, there are several critical moments (four
in our standard design), of which one will be the imperative
FIGURE 1 |Top. Course of events on a single trial in a typical foreperiod
(FP) paradigm. Here, the neutral warning stimulus (S1) and the target
stimulus (S2) are both visual and the location of S2 (left or right of ﬁxation)
requires a spatially compatible manual choice response. Bottom. A family
of idealized data patterns. (A) Mean reaction time as a function of FP in
the constant-FP and the variable-FP paradigm (uniform FP-distribution).
(B) Mean reaction time as a function of FP in the variable-FP paradigm for
different distributions of FP. (C) Mean reaction time in the variable-FP
paradigm (uniform distribution), as a function of FP on trial n and FP on
trial n − 1.
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Table 1 | Overview of definitions.
Concept Definition
S1 Warning stimulus that serves as a mere time
marker for the occurrence of S2
S2 Target stimulus that requires a speeded
response
Foreperiod (FP) Inter stimulus interval between S1 and S2
Critical moment A possible moment of S2 presentation relative
to the offset of S1
Imperative moment The moment of S2 presentation, on any given
trial, relative to the offset of S1
MTP Multiple trace theory of temporal preparation
Trace weight The strength of a memory trace in its
contribution to temporal preparation
AI-ratio Hypothetical ratio between activation and
inhibition values across memory traces
moment on any particular trial (see Table 1 for an overview of
deﬁnitions).
Figure 1A shows mean RT as a function of FP as typi-
cally observed in the constant-FP paradigm and the variable-FP
paradigm with a uniform distribution (e.g., Woodrow, 1914; Los
and Van den Heuvel, 2001; Los et al., 2001)2. Clearly, with an
increase of FP, mean RT increases in the constant-FP paradigm,
but decreases in the variable-FP paradigm, typically according
to an exponential decay function. These RT–FP functions con-
verge toward the longer FPs, such that no difference remains at the
longest FP. The striking difference between these functions may
easily obscure that they are in fact members of the same family.
To see this, consider the effect of the following FP distributions
(or their discrete counterparts) in the variable-FP paradigm: uni-
form, exponential (i.e., when FPs occur more frequently as they
are shorter), and anti-exponential (i.e., when FPs occur more fre-
quently as they are longer). Typical data are shown in Figure 1B
(e.g., Zahn and Rosenthal, 1966; Baumeister and Joubert, 1969;
Näätänen, 1970, 1971; Trillenberg et al., 2000). Clearly, as the rela-
tive frequency of short FPs increases, the FP–RT function gradually
lies down and becomes approximately ﬂat in the case of an expo-
nential FP-distribution (e.g., Näätänen, 1971; Trillenberg et al.,
2000; Vangkilde et al., 2013). By extrapolation, it can be inferred
that the RT–FP function will end up upward sloping when the
probability of each FP is set to 1 in different blocks, as is the case
in the constant-FP paradigm.
The last member of the family of FP phenomena is the asym-
metric sequential effect of FP. This effect can be observed in the
variable-FP paradigm when RT on any trial n is analyzed, not
only as a function of FP on that trial (FPn), but also of FP on
the immediately preceding trial (FPn−1). As Figure 1C shows, the
2The effects of FP shown in Figure 1 are idealized to facilitate seeing the inter-
relationships among them. The many studies cited in the text attest to their
robustness.
typical pattern is that RT is longer to the extent that FPn−1 is
longer than FPn. As a result, for the shortest FPn, RT strongly
increases as FPn−1 increases. This dependence on FPn−1 becomes
less as FPn increases, and eventually disappears for the longest
FPn (e.g., Woodrow, 1914; Karlin, 1959; Drazin, 1961; Zahn et al.,
1963; Los and Van den Heuvel, 2001; Van der Lubbe et al., 2004;
Vallesi and Shallice, 2007; Steinborn and Langner, 2012). Of note
is the relationship of the asymmetrical sequential effect with the
FP-distribution effect (Figure 1B). If the relative frequency of
short FPs increases, short FPs are increasingly more often pre-
ceded by short FPs and increasingly less often by long FPs. As a
result, favorable FP transitions (in terms of RT) are increasingly
more frequent for the short FPs, which in turn should contribute
to a ﬂatter RT–FP function, averaged across FPn−1.
Finally, it is worth noting that these typical effects break down
for brief FP durations and for brief ranges of FPs. If FP is varied
at brief intervals up to about 300 ms, RT decreases exponentially
as a function of FP, not only in the variable-FP paradigm (e.g.,
Los andVan der Burg, 2013) but also in the constant-FP paradigm
(e.g., Los and Schut, 2008). This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea
that temporal preparation is not an instantaneous process, but
takes time to develop. Thus, in the constant-FP paradigm, the RT–
FP function initially decreases sharply, reaches its nadir by about
300 ms, after which it increases slowly (Figure 1A) until it levels
off toward 20 s (e.g., Woodrow, 1914; Klemmer, 1956; Müller-
Gethmann et al., 2003; Lawrence and Klein, 2013). Furthermore,
if the range of FP durations is small relative to the mean duration
of FP, the RT–FP function becomes less pronounced and sequen-
tial effects have been shown to deviate from the typical pattern
shown in Figure 1C (Karlin, 1959; Steinborn et al., 2008). These
deviations probably reﬂect the inaccuracy of ourmental timekeep-
ing system, which has been shown to scale with the duration of FP
following a Weber fraction (e.g., Klemmer, 1957; Gibbon, 1977;
Roberts, 1981; Gallistel and Gibbon, 2000).
In the present contribution, the focus is on the family of FP
effects shown in Figure 1, which we consider to be most revealing
about the learning principles underlying temporal preparation.
The just noted deviations seem less important in this respect,
although they may be informative about the nature of the timing
mechanism involved.
TWO EXPLANATORY CONSTRUCTS
THE HAZARD FUNCTION
The hazard function describes the development of the conditional
probability that S2 will occur at the next critical moment, given
that it has not yet occurred. Thus, in our standard design with
a uniform FP distribution, the hazard is 1/4 for the ﬁrst criti-
cal moment at the very beginning of FP. If the ﬁrst moment is
passed without occurrence of S2, the hazard increases to 1/3 for
the second critical moment, because three equiprobable critical
moments remain. If this moment is also passed without S2 occur-
rence, it increases further to 1/2 for the third critical moment.
Finally, if S2 has still not occurred by that time, the participant can
be certain that S2 will occur at the last critical moment, and the
hazard thus becomes 1. In the anti-exponential distribution, this
increasing hazard over subsequent critical moments is even more
dramatic, whereas in the exponential (“non-aging”) distribution
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it has a constant value across critical moments (e.g., 1/2)3. Finally,
the hazard is also constant in the constant-FP paradigm, where its
value is ﬁxed at 1.
In itself, the hazard function is just a statistical fact determined
by the FP distribution, but its merit as an explanatory construct of
FP phenomena has been recognized since the earliest reports on
variable FPphenomena (Woodrow,1914; for recent contributions,
see e.g., Janssen and Shadlen, 2005; Nobre et al., 2007; Coull, 2009;
Cui et al., 2009; Vangkilde et al., 2012, 2013). The general idea is
that hazard drives temporal preparation (or the expectancy of S2
presentation) and thus comes indirectly to expression in theRT–FP
function. In a detailed version of this idea, temporal preparation is
considered to be an effortful process that can be maintained at an
optimal level for only a very brief period of time (e.g., Näätänen,
1971; Gottsdanker, 1975; Jennings and Van der Molen, 2005). As a
result, participants optimize their state of preparation in keeping
with the hazard function, so as to minimize the time spent in idle
preparation (Vallesi and Shallice, 2007). Although in most writ-
ings the causal chain leading from hazard to the RT–FP function
remains implicit, some version has to be endorsed, since otherwise
hazard would be an essentially meaningless statistical fact in the
literature of temporal preparation.
A major reason why the hazard function has found general
acceptance as a valid explanatory construct is that it well explains
the shape of the RT–FP functions in the variable-FP paradigm
(e.g., Niemi and Näätänen, 1981; Luce, 1986; Coull, 2009). As can
be easily veriﬁed, mean RT in Figure 1B is shorter as the haz-
ard at the imperative moment is higher, and in the exponential
FP-distribution, the constant hazard co-occurs with an approxi-
mately ﬂat RT–FP function (e.g., Näätänen, 1971; Trillenberg et al.,
2000; Vangkilde et al., 2013). This strongly suggests that temporal
preparation is driven by hazard: The higher the hazard, the higher
the preparatory state.
Although the hazard function excellently accounts for themean
RT–FP functions in the variable-FP paradigm, it fails remark-
ably in accounting for the other phenomena of the family. First,
the hazard function completely fails to explain the asymmetric
sequential effect of FP (Figure 1C). The hazard function is ﬁxed
for any speciﬁc FP distribution, so it should drive temporal prepa-
ration in the same way on each and every trial of a block, that is,
independent of the FP that occurred on the preceding trial. Sec-
ond, the hazard is constant for each critical moment in both the
constant-FP paradigm (a value of 1) and the variable-FP paradigm
with an exponential FP-distribution (a value of, e.g., 1/2), yet the
slopes of the corresponding RT–FP functions are not the same (cf.
Figures 1A,B). In the constant-FP paradigm, the upward-sloping
RT–FP function has invariably been attributed to time uncertainty
(caused by an imperfect time keeping device), which increases in
3Given a constant hazard p across critical moments, the a priori probability that S2
will be presented at critical moment k (1, 2, 3, . . .) equals p(1 − p)k−1 (Nickerson
andBurnham,1969). Furthermore, tomaintain a constant hazard for the last critical
moment, an appropriate proportion of catch trials (i.e., trials without S2) should be
added. Interestingly, response at the longest FPn has been found to slow down after
a catch trial on trial n− 1 (e.g., Correa et al., 2004; Los, 2004; Los and Agter, 2005).
This is consistent with the general pattern of sequential effects (Figure 1C), because
a catch trial can be conceived as a trial with a long FP that extends beyond the latest
critical moment.
proportion with the duration of FP (e.g., Klemmer, 1956, 1957;
Müller-Gethmann et al., 2003). This inference relies on the fact
that the hazard for each critical moment is constant, such that any
source of uncertainty other than time uncertainty is controlled
for. However, the hazard for each critical moment is also con-
stant for non-aging FPs (i.e., an exponential FP-distribution), so
one would expect the RT–FP function in this condition to be also
upward sloping instead of ﬂat. That is, the approximately ﬂat
RT–FP function for non-aging FPs is problematic for the view
of hazard-driven preparation rather than support for it, as often
claimed.
Apart from these empirical problems, there is also a theoretical
problem that deserves consideration. As the hazard function by
itself is devoid of psychological content, it remains to be speciﬁed
how participants acquire knowledge about the changing hazard
during FP. The literature is remarkably silent on this important
issue. Since RT–FP functions similar to those observed in adults
have been observed in young children (Elliott, 1970; Vallesi and
Shallice, 2007) as well as in non-human mammals, such as mon-
keys and rodents (Janssen and Shadlen, 2005; Narayanan and
Laubach, 2006; Tsunoda and Kakei, 2008), it seems clear that the
critical parameters for constructing the hazard function must be
acquired through experience rather than through instruction. This
in turn raises questions about how experience is transformed into
a hazard computation and moreover, on which sample of trials
this inference is based. Ironically, if the sample is small or if recent
trials receive a greater weight than earlier trials in a block, propo-
nents of the hazard function will have to face the sequential effect
of FP, which they have usually chosen to ignore.
TRACE CONDITIONING
To avoid the problems with the hazard function, Los and Van den
Heuvel (2001; see also, e.g., Los and Heslenfeld, 2005; Steinborn
et al., 2009; Los, 2013) reasoned that it is crucial to come up ﬁrst
with an explanation of the asymmetric sequential effect of FP. This
explanation would indirectly account for the other phenomena of
the family by simple averaging across sequential effects. Obvi-
ously, the downward sloping RT–FP function of Figure 1A follows
directly from averaging across FPn−1 (Figure 1C). By extension,
the FP-distribution effect (Figure 1B) would reﬂect that inter-
trial repetitions of short FPs occur more frequently as the skew
of the FP distribution becomes more positive, thus explaining the
corresponding ﬂattening of the average RT–FP function.
To account for the asymmetric sequential effect, Los and Van
den Heuvel (2001) proposed a trace-conditioning model, based
on learning principles described in the literature on animal tim-
ing (e.g., Bradshaw and Szabadi, 1997). This model assumes that
participants act on the basis of a mental representation of the
critical moments. In this representation, each critical moment is
associated with a variable conditioned strength. The higher the
conditioned strength of a critical moment, the faster the partic-
ipant responds if S2 is presented at that critical moment. It is
furthermore assumed that the response system is kept under inhi-
bition during FP to prevent premature response, whereas a wave of
activation is releasedwhen S2 is presented and responded to. These
inhibitory and activating processes adjust the conditioned strength
of each critical moment in accordance with three learning rules.
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First, as a critical moment is passed by during FP, its conditioned
strength is reduced (extinction). For each critical moment, extinc-
tion gradually increases as that moment is approached, reaches
its maximum as it is passed by and gradually reduces afterward.
Second, when S2 is presented and responded to, the conditioned
strength of critical moments is increased (reinforcement). Rein-
forcement is maximal at the imperative moment and tapers off
toward earlier and later critical moments as they are more remote
from the imperative moment. Third, the conditioned strength of
critical moments beyond the imperative moment are left relatively
unchanged, because they are neither passed by during FP, nor used
for the presentation of S2.
Figure 2 (graphs) illustrates the dynamics of this model. Sup-
pose that at the start of a given trial, each critical moment has an
equal conditioned strength (Figure 2A) and that, unbeknownst
to the participant, the third critical moment is about to become
the imperative moment of that trial. Now, as the ﬁrst two critical
moments are passedduringFP, the conditioned strength associated
with those moments is subject to extinction (Figures 2B,C). Sub-
sequently, when S2 is presented and responded to, the conditioned
strength of the imperative moment is increased (Figure 2D).
Finally, the conditioned strength of the last critical moment is
left relatively unchanged, because it is neither passed by during FP,
nor used for the presentation of the S2. The state of conditioning
that is reached after the response of the participant (Figure 2E) is
preserved and carries over to the next trial. Thus, on the next trial,
response is expected to be relatively slow when S2 is presented at
the (just extinguished) ﬁrst or second critical moment, and rel-
atively fast when it occurs at the (just reinforced) third critical
moment or at the (unchanged) last critical moment, consistent
with the asymmetric sequential effect. Also note that the last crit-
ical moment is virtually immune to whatever FP occurred on the
preceding trial, because its conditioned strength is never subject
to appreciable extinction, such that it will be driven to ceiling after
a few reinforcing trials (i.e., with S2 appearing at the last critical
moment).
The core assumptions of this trace-conditioning model are
consistent with Machado’s (1997) formal model in the animal
timing literature. Los et al. (2001; see also Los, 2013) adjusted
this model and obtained a good ﬁt when they applied it simul-
taneously to the pattern of asymmetric sequential effects in the
variable-FP paradigm (Figure 1C) and the mean RT–FP functions
in both paradigms (Figure 1A). Furthermore, the model is sup-
ported by a large body of evidence indicating that several areas of
the central nervous system are kept under inhibition during FP
(e.g., Hasbroucq et al., 1999; Prut and Fetz, 1999; Narayanan and
Laubach, 2006; Van Elswijk et al., 2007). It has been argued that
this inhibition serves to prevent a response from being emitted
prematurely (e.g., Narayanan et al., 2006; Davranche et al., 2007;
Duque and Ivry, 2009) and Los (2013) presented behavioral evi-
dence for a causal link between this function and the extinction
mechanism of the trace-conditioning model. Finally, several other
studies have provided support for the model by showing that fac-
tors that are known to modify the conditioned response in animal
timing also modify the sequential effect of FP, suggesting com-
mon underlying mechanisms (Steinborn et al., 2008, 2009, 2010;
Langner et al., 2010).
FIGURE 2 |Within trial dynamics according to the trace-conditioning
model of temporal preparation (graphs) and the formation of a
memory trace according to the multiple trace theory of temporal
preparation (colored bars). Graphs (A) Hypothetical state of conditioning
at the start of a trial, showing an equal conditioned strength for each critical
moment. (B,C) During the FP inhibition is applied, resulting in a reduction
of the conditioned strength of critical moments as they are passed by
during FP. (D) At the imperative moment, a wave of activation is released
when S2 is presented and responded to, which results in an increase of the
conditioned strength, especially at the imperative moment. (E) Final state
of conditioning, which carries over to the next trial. Colored bars. The bars
show the creation of a memory trace that represents the cumulative levels
of inhibition (red shades) and activation (black shades) for each time point
during FP.
Unfortunately, the model fares less well when considering the
effect of FP distribution (Figure 1B). As noted earlier, the initial
idea was that the FP-distribution effect is a simple consequence
of the sequential effect, because shifts in the FP distribution co-
occur with shifts in the relative frequency of speciﬁc intertrial
transitions. However, closer examination reveals that the con-
tribution of the sequential effect to the mean RT–FP function
is insufﬁciently powerful to account for the full FP-distribution
effect. As Figure 1C shows, the RT–FP function in the uniform FP-
distribution is approximately ﬂat after a short FPn−1 andmore and
more downward sloping as FPn−1 increases. In the exponential
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FP-distribution with a constant hazard of 1/2, half of the trials is
preceded by the shortest FPn−1; the other half is preceded by a
longer FPn−1. Therefore, the RT–FP function resulting after aver-
aging across the effect of FPn−1 should still be downward sloping
instead of ﬂat, as typically observed (Figure 1B). Using a for-
mal procedure, Los and Agter (2005) estimated the contribution
of sequential effects to the FP-distribution effect, and established
that it was below 20% in all conditions they examined. The bot-
tom line is that the FP-distribution effect cannot be conceived as
a simple propagation of the asymmetric sequential effect of FP
(see also Drazin, 1961; Zahn and Rosenthal, 1966; Alegria and
Delhaye-Rembaux, 1975; Possamaï et al., 1975).
More recent studies have further challenged the trace-
conditioning model by showing that the coupling between the
sequential effect of FP and the shape of the RT–FP function is
loose at best. For instance,Vallesi et al. (2013) used the variable-FP
paradigm with a uniform FP-distribution, and varied the inter-
trial interval. They observed that an increase of the intertrial
interval attenuated the sequential effect and its asymmetry while
leaving the average RT–FP function relatively unchanged. Con-
versely, Vallesi and Shallice (2007) observed that, across different
age groups ranging from 4 years old up to adulthood, the aver-
age RT–FP function, under a uniform condition, became steeper
whereas the sequential effect remained fairly stable (though not
its asymmetry). These and similar dissociations between sequen-
tial effects and the average RT–FP function (e.g., Vallesi et al.,
2007, 2009; Triviño et al., 2010; Steinborn and Langner, 2011;
Capizzi et al., 2012) have clearly revealed the limitations of the
trace-conditioning model.
INTERIM SUMMARY: A SPLIT IN THE FAMILY?
The evidence just reviewed suggests that the family ties among FP
phenomena may not be as strong as earlier assumed. Indeed, the
rather loose coupling between the asymmetrical sequential effect
of FP on the one hand and the mean RT–FP function and the
FP-distribution effect on the other hand suggests a split in the
family of FP phenomena along the lines of longevity. On the one
side of the split, we have the sequential effect, which represents an
ephemeral short-term effect, while on the other side of the split
we have the mean RT–FP function and the FP-distribution effect,
which represent a more endurable long-term effect.
The relative independence of long-term and short-term effects
poses the challenge to account for these effects from a single
integrative point of view. Both hazard-based preparation and
trace conditioning fail in this respect, since the former cannot
account for short-term effects, whereas the latter cannot ade-
quately account for long-term effects (see Table 2 for a summary
of strengths and weaknesses). We now turn to possible solutions.
First, we discuss the dual-process model, which takes the posi-
tion that the short-term and long-term effects of FP are driven
by different mechanisms. Then we present MTP, which conceives
the short-term and long-term effects as different expressions of a
single implicit learning mechanism.
THE DUAL-PROCESS MODEL
Vallesi and Shallice (2007) proposed a dual-process model, which
maintains the hazard function as an explanatory construct for
the long-term FP phenomena and adds a short-term compo-
nent to explain the sequential effect of FP. They envisaged the
short-term component as an automatic “refractory” cost, which
is proportional to the expenditure of preparatory resources on
the preceding trial. The idea is that maintaining a high prepara-
tory state over a relatively long FP depletes preparatory resources,
which subsequently need time to recover. Therefore, when oper-
ating in isolation, the short-term component causes response on
trial n to be slower as FPn−1 is longer, regardless of the duration of
FPn. However, the short-term component typically does not oper-
ate in isolation, but co-occurs with the long-term component,
Table 2 | Summary of four explanations of key phenomena in temporal preparation (cf. Figure 1), and their strengths and weaknesses.
Explanation Strengths Weaknesses
Hazard-based preparation
Preparation is driven in accordance with the hazard
function
Accounts well for long-term effects (e.g., FP
distribution effect)
No explanation for short-term effects; unclear
cognitive basis of hazard
Trace conditioning
Conditioned strength at critical moments is
adjusted by inhibition during FP and activation
upon S2 presentation
Accounts well for short-term effects
(asymmetric sequential effect)
No adequate explanation for long-term effects;
No explanation for relative independence of
short-term and long-term effects
Dual process model
Combines hazard-based preparation with
automatic carry-over of a refractory cost
Accounts for both short-term and long-term
effects (Figure 1)
Disparate components for long-term and
short-term effects; Unclear cognitive basis of
the hazard-based component
Multiple trace theory of temporal preparation (MTP)
Combines dynamics of trace conditioning with
storage in separate memory traces
Accounts for both short-term and long-term
effects (Figure 1); Relies on well-established
cognitive principles
Untested
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representing controlled, hazard-driven preparation. It is assumed
that hazard-driven preparation comes to dominate the prepara-
tory state as FPn lengthens, thereby compensating the refractory
cost. As a result, a strong sequential effect is observed at the shortest
FPn where the refractory cost goes unopposed by hazard-driven
preparation. As FPn increases, the growing inﬂuence of hazard-
driven preparation gradually reduces the refractory cost to the
point that nothing of it remains at the longest FPn. In short,
according to the dual-process model, the sequential effect reﬂects
a refractory cost inﬂicted by sustained preparation on trial n − 1,
whereas its asymmetry is caused by an increasing dominance of
hazard-driven preparation as FPn lengthens.
The combination of a short-term and long-term component
endows the dual-process model with considerable explanatory
power. The sequential effect is explained by the refractory compo-
nent, the average RT–FP function across different FP distributions
is explained by the hazard component, while the asymmetry of
the sequential effect reﬂects the dynamic interplay of these compo-
nents. That is, themodel essentially explains all the keyphenomena
of Figure 1. Furthermore, by attributing the main effect of FP and
the sequential effect of FP to the operation of different functional
components, the model seems well equipped to explain the inde-
pendent modiﬁcation of these effects by a variety of experimental
factors, as noted in the section on trace conditioning4.
In spite of these assets, this model can be seriously challenged
on its theoretical assumptions. First, by maintaining the hazard
function as an explanatory construct, the model inherits the key
problem that it is unclear how participants acquire readily applica-
ble knowledge about the changing hazard over time. Second, the
assumed controlled nature of hazard-driven preparation is dis-
putable because FP duration is a task irrelevant variable, which
needs no monitoring for correct task performance. Attempts to
empirically demonstrate a role for cognitive control during FP,
by examining whether the RT–FP function becomes ﬂatter when
resources are supposedly withdrawn from the tracking of time
during FP, have yielded mixed results (Van Lambalgen and Los,
2008; Steinborn and Langner, 2011; Vallesi et al., 2014). But even
if cognitive control turns out to be an indispensible part of tempo-
ral preparation, it is still unclear whether it reﬂects hazard-driven
preparation during FP or some other controlled process. For
instance, it is conceivable that control must be exerted to keep the
response system in check during FP, so as to prevent premature
response – a process unrelated to the hazard function (Narayanan
et al., 2006; Los, 2013). Third, the notion of resource depletion
(the basis of the model’s short-term component) has a controver-
sial status in experimental psychology, where it has been criticized
as circular (e.g., Navon, 1984; Neumann, 1987) and impeding the
discovery of more fundamental mechanisms (e.g., Pashler, 1994;
Olivers and Meeter, 2008). Fourth, it remains somewhat opaque
4Note, though, that the dual-process model does not always predict independence
of the sequential effect of FP and the average RT–FP function, because at longer FPs,
the short-term component is dominated by the hazard-driven component rather
than being independent of it. In particular, factors that reduce the effectiveness
of the hazard-driven contribution to the preparatory state should also reduce the
asymmetry of the sequential effect of FP, because the refractory cost is then less
strongly dominated at the longer FPs. We are aware of only one study in which this
critical ﬁnding has been reported (Vallesi and Shallice, 2007).
by what combination rule the two components interact. As long
as no rule is speciﬁed, it is hard to assess what sequential effects
the model actually predicts.
It seems possible to alleviate some of these problems without
affecting the essence of the dual-process model. For instance, to
solve the problem associated with resource depletion, one may
conceive of the short-term component in terms of reinforcement
at the imperativemoment, followed by quick decay (e.g., Los, 2013;
Yashar and Lamy, 2013). The short-lived reinforcement would
then come to expression in the case of an intertrial repetition of
short FPs, where it compensates for low hazard-driven prepara-
tion, but not in the case of an intertrial repetition of long FPs,
where it is redundant to high hazard-driven preparation. Further-
more, there seems to be no compelling reason that hazard-driven
preparation must be a controlled process, and this assumption
can be dropped without altering the dual-process character of
the model. However, the other two problems are more princi-
pled as they go to the essence of the dual-process model. That
is, any variant of this model will have to specify how participants
access the parameters necessary for estimating the development
of hazard over time, as well as the way hazard-driven prepara-
tion interacts with the short-term component responsible for the
sequential effect.
These critical notes aside, it should be noted that the dual-
process model is the only model to date that accounts for all the
phenomena shown in Figure 1. To achieve this feat, it sacriﬁces
the unity of the family, by qualifying the sequential effect as a
phenomenon that is fundamentally different from the long-term
phenomena in temporal preparation (cf. Table 2).
TOWARD A MULTIPLE TRACE THEORY OF TEMPORAL
PREPARATION
The theory that we outline in this section belongs to a large class
of multiple-trace theories, which have been very successful in
explaining behavior in a great variety of tasks, including object cat-
egorization (Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Hintzman, 1986; Nosofsky
and Palmeri, 1997), lexical decision (Logan, 1988, 1990), priming
(Neill, 1997), visual search (Chunand Jiang,1998;Hillstrom, 2000;
Huang et al., 2004), and recently also time perception (Taatgen
and Van Rijn, 2011). Multiple-trace theories share three basic
assumptions. First, the attended elements constituting an episode
are obligatorily stored in memory. It is typically assumed that an
episode is demarcated by the outlines of a trial and that the stored
elements include the intentions of the participant that applied
during that trial (e.g., the task set), the relevant stimuli attended
by the participant as well as the relevant actions. Second, each
episode is stored as a single memory trace, which is added to
an ever accumulating database of memory traces. Third, a new
episode leads to a parallel retrieval of old memory traces to the
extent that these traces contain elements (e.g., stimuli) that are
currently attended. As a consequence, the repeated presentation of
a stimulus in a given task context leads to an automatic retrieval of
previous actions associated with that stimulus (e.g., Logan, 1988,
1990).
We develop MTP as an adjustment of the trace-conditioning
model discussed earlier (cf. Figure 2). This is a natural way to
proceed, because conditioning and multiple-trace theories share
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basic assumptions in the automatic retrieval of actions elicited
by an attended stimulus. In particular, the idea that, after an
acquisition phase, the presentation of a conditioned stimulus
triggers a conditioned response, is perfectly consistent with the
idea that an external event elicits an associated response by the
obligatory retrieval of old memory traces. The main difference
between these views is in the way experiences are stored in mem-
ory: Whereas in conditioning theory, it is usually assumed that
the state of conditioning is committed to memory as a single,
adjustable memory trace, in multiple-trace theory, each new expe-
rience is stored as a unique memory trace. The difference between
these views can be easily bridged, however, and this is what MTP
does.
OUTLINES OF THE THEORY
Multiple trace theory of temporal preparation assumes that the
dynamics on a single trial are the same as those described by the
trace-conditioning model. That is, inhibition is applied during
FP, to prevent premature response, while activation is released at
the imperative moment when S2 is presented and responded to.
However, instead of adjusting a state of conditioning, these pro-
cesses are assumed to leave a more direct trace in memory, as they
embody the preparatory experience. In particular, for each critical
moment up till the imperative moment, the accumulated strength
of inhibition and activation is stored in a single memory trace. It
is furthermore assumed that the stored strength of activation has
a lower maximum and a greater temporal dispersion as the imper-
ative moment is more remote from S1, reﬂecting the growing time
uncertainty as a function of FP (Klemmer, 1957). Other relevant
events of a trial are also stored in the memory trace, including
attended details of S1, S2, and the response with respect to S2. On
each new trial, S1 serves as a retrieval cue for all relevant memory
traces that were stored on earlier trials. At each critical moment
during FP, these memory traces contribute to the preparatory state
in accordance with their stored level of inhibition or activation for
that moment. Finally, MTP assumes that newly formed memory
traces are initially in a high state of activation, which decays over
time toward a lower asymptotic level (cf. Taatgen and Van Rijn,
2011). As a result, the most recently formed memory traces con-
tribute more strongly to current preparation than older traces. We
refer to this activation level of the memory trace as trace weight
to avoid possible confusion with the strength of activation at the
imperative moment – an activation level that is stored inside the
memory trace.
The colored bars of Figure 2 show the creation of a memory
trace during a single trial according to MTP.Accumulated strength
of inhibition is shown by red shades and strength of activation by
black shades. Since the third critical moment was the imperative
moment, relatively strong inhibition accumulated at the (passed)
ﬁrst criticalmoment (dark red), some inhibition at the second crit-
ical moment (light red), and activation at the imperative moment
(black). The fourth critical moment is not stored in the memory
trace, because the relevant episode was concluded by the response
of the participant, that is, before the fourth critical moment was
reached. Figure 3 shows 16 memory traces that have been created
over as many preceding trials under a uniform (Figure 3A) and
exponential FP-distribution (Figure 3B). When comparing the
FIGURE 3 | Schematic overview of the multiple-trace theory of
temporal preparation. (A,B) Sixteen memory traces formed on
subsequent trials under a uniform and exponential distribution of FPs. Each
memory trace stores the preparatory experience of a trial in terms of
accumulated inhibition during FP (shown by red) and activation at the
imperative moment (shown by black), consistent with the dynamics of the
trace-conditioning model (cf. Figure 2). Recently formed memory traces
contribute more strongly to current preparation, as speciﬁed by their
height. Note that under the exponential distribution, there is one catch trial,
which lacks the activation component (black) in its trace. (C,D)The
development of current preparation when all memory traces are weighted
equally (solid line) and when weighted in accordance with their recency
(broken lines). (E,F)Translation from preparation into observed mean
reaction times (RTs). The curves in graphs C–F are all schematic.
different memory traces, note that activation is more dispersed
over time as FP increases. Speciﬁcally, the dispersion of the black
shades (activation) around the imperative moment on trials with
the longest FP (e.g., Figure 3A, trial 2) is greater than on trials
with the shortest FP (e.g., Figure 3A, trial 3). Also note that the
relative weights of the traces are schematically depicted by their
height. Speciﬁcally, the memory traces formed across the most
recent trials (trials 14–16) are thicker than earlier formed memory
traces.
Now, suppose that on the next trial (i.e., trial 17) the longest FP
is initiated by the presentation of S1. At any moment during FPn,
all previously formed memory traces contribute to preparation
in proportion to (1) their stored inhibition or activation value
for that moment and (2) their trace weight. For ease of exposi-
tion, we refer to the ﬁrst contribution, when aggregated across
trials, as activation-inhibition ratio (AI ratio). To obtain the ulti-
mate level of preparation, differences in trace-weight should also
be taken into account. Assuming that the older memory traces
(formed more than, let’s say, three trials back) have approached an
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approximately equal asymptotic value, this simply means that the
inhibition and activation values stored in themost recently formed
memory traces contribute more strongly to current preparation
than older traces.
The solid line of Figure 3C shows how temporal preparation
would develop on the new trial 17 when it is exclusively driven
by the AI ratio. As the ﬁrst critical moment is approached dur-
ing FP, the AI ratio is low (many more traces contain red than
black at this point in time), yielding a low preparatory state. As
time elapses further, the AI ratio gradually increases, because the
contribution of aggregated inhibition gradually decreases rela-
tive to that of activation, thereby boosting preparation. By the
time the last critical moment is reached, the contribution of
inhibition has vanished, such that temporal preparation reaches
its optimum. The broken line in Figure 3C shows how tem-
poral preparation would develop if trace weights are taken into
account. Here preparation reaches a high level even at the earli-
est critical moment, owing to the high trace weight of the most
recently formed memory trace, which represents a trial on which
S2 appeared at the earliest critical moment. Thus, despite a low
AI ratio, preparation at a critical moment could still be high if a
high activation level for that moment is stored in a memory trace
with a high weight (i.e., a recently formed memory trace). Finally,
Figure 3E shows how the level of temporal preparation translates
into mean RT.
ACCOUNTING FOR THE FAMILY OF FP EFFECTS
According to MTP, the family of phenomena in temporal prepa-
ration are all different expressions of the same mechanism.
First, consider the effects of Figure 1A. The downward slop-
ing mean RT–FP function in the variable-FP paradigm reﬂects
the increasing AI ratio across subsequent critical moments as
described above. The AI ratio is irrelevant in the constant-
FP paradigm, because the same FP is repeated across trials,
such that the preparatory state reaches its optimum at the
imperative moment regardless the duration of FP. Here, the
upward sloping RT–FP function reﬂects that the stored acti-
vation values are more dispersed over time as the imperative
moment is more remote from S1. As a result, when activa-
tion values are aggregated across trials, the resulting preparation
function has a greater spread and a lower maximum, consis-
tent with the scalar property observed in animal timing (e.g.,
Roberts, 1981; Gallistel and Gibbon, 2000) as well as with
notions of increasing time uncertainty as a function of FP (e.g.,
Klemmer, 1957; Niemi and Näätänen, 1981; Müller-Gethmann
et al., 2003).
Second, the sequential effect of FP (Figure 1C) reﬂects that
the weight of the most recently formed memory trace is relatively
high, such that its stored preparatory experience contributes rela-
tively strongly to current preparation. The asymmetry of this effect
is explained in the same way as by the trace-conditioning model:
Inhibition is stored for critical moments preceding but not follow-
ing the imperative moment. Therefore, the level of preparation on
trial n is reduced by inhibition on trial n− 1 if FPn is shorter than
FPn−1 but not if it is longer. Finally, to the extent that a critical
moment is passed by during FP, it becomes more strongly associ-
ated with inhibition and less strongly with activation that “spills
over” from the imperative moment (see Figure 2, ﬁrst versus sec-
ond critical moment). This explains that RT on trial n is longer to
the extent that FPn−1 was longer than FPn, an effect that is clearest
for the shortest FPn (Figure 1C).
Third, the FP-distribution effect (Figure 1B) is mainly
explained by differential AI ratios, as illustrated by Figure 3 for
the uniform and the exponential distribution. At the ﬁrst critical
moment, the AI ratio is much lower under the uniform distri-
bution than under the exponential distribution, because memory
traces with high inhibition values at this moment are far more
frequent under the uniform distribution. However, this differ-
ence between distributions diminishes across subsequent critical
moments (Figure 3A versus Figure 3B). Therefore, when abstract-
ing from a possible compensating inﬂuence of the most recently
formed memory traces, preparation is lower for the uniform dis-
tribution early during FP but catches up as FP increases (Figure 3C
versus Figure 3D, solid traces), which explains the steeper average
RT–FP function for the uniform distribution (Figure 3E ver-
sus Figure 3F). This aggregated effect across memory traces is
strengthened by differential frequencies of speciﬁc intertrial tran-
sitions. In particular, a repetition of the shortest FPoccurs farmore
often under the exponential distribution than under the uniform
distribution. Thus, under the exponential distribution, prepara-
tion is more often boosted at the ﬁrst critical moment through
high trace weights, which further reduces the slope of the average
RT–FP function.
Fourth, MTP has a straightforward solution for the relative
independence of the short-term and long-term effects in temporal
preparation. In particular, the short-term effect (the asymmet-
ric sequential effect) is explained in terms of the recency of newly
formedmemory traces,whereas the long-termeffects (averageRT–
FP function and the FP-distribution effect) aremainly explained in
terms of the relative frequency of distinctive memory traces. Thus,
any factor that selectively inﬂuences either the recency or the rela-
tive frequency of distinctive memory traces will selectively modify
the short-term and long-term effects, respectively. For instance,
the ﬁnding of Vallesi et al. (2013) that the duration of the intertrial
interval attenuates the asymmetric sequential effect while leaving
the average RT–FP function largely unaffected, would reﬂect that
this variable inﬂuences the trace weights of recently formed mem-
ory traces while leaving the relative frequency of distinctive traces
unaffected.
Finally, MTP also provides a natural account of effects of non-
temporal features associated with FP (see Schröter et al., 2014; for
a related idea and Thomaschke and Dreisbach, in press for an
alternative account). For instance, in the time-event correlation
paradigm, each speciﬁc S2-response pair has an equal probabil-
ity of occurrence on each trial, but one pair is more probable
after a short FP than after a long FP (e.g., 4/5 vs. 1/5), whereas
these probabilities are reversed for another pair. It has been shown
that the ensuing time-event correlation gets gradually expressed in
behavior: Over the course of the experimental session, participants
come to respond faster and more accurately to S2 when it occurs
after its typical FP than when it occurs after its atypical FP (e.g.,
Miller and Schröter, 2002, Experiment 8; Wagener and Hoffmann,
2010; Thomaschke et al., 2011; Thomaschke and Dreisbach, 2013,
in press). Meanwhile, participants remain generally unaware of
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this time-event correlation, as evidenced by self-report after the
experimental session (e.g., Thomaschke et al., 2011; Thomaschke
andDreisbach, in press). These ﬁndings are readily accommodated
by MTP, which assumes that the speciﬁc stimuli and responses of
each trial get represented in the memory trace along with the
duration of FP. As a result, memory traces with frequent com-
binations of FP and speciﬁc stimuli or responses will come to
dominate traces with infrequent combinations of these features,
thereby facilitating the corresponding behavior, consistent with
the observations.
Our suggestion to account for time-event correlation effects
in terms of MTP must be accompanied by a caveat. When S2-
response pairs are deﬁned by a compatible spatial relationship
(as in Figure 1, top), intertrial repetitions of the speciﬁc S2 have
been reported to yield slower responses than intertrial alternations
of the speciﬁc S2 (e.g., Kirby, 1976; Soetens et al., 1985). MTP
clearly predicts the opposite result, especially when FP is repeated
in addition to the speciﬁc S2. Therefore, contributions other than
those discussed here appear to be involved, such as a subjective
expectancy of an alternation elicited by the preceding sequence of
trials (e.g., Kirby, 1976; Soetens et al., 1985; Soetens, 1998; Jentzsch
and Sommer, 2002) or inhibition of return (Posner and Cohen,
1984; Klein, 2000; Los, 2004). However, since repetition costs are
the exception rather than the rule (e.g., Pashler and Baylis, 1991)
they do not falsify the general principles of MTP.
In short, MTP provides a coherent explanation of the family of
phenomena in temporal preparation shown in Figure 1 as well as
a framework for understanding patterns of dissociations between
short-term and long-term FP effects. MTP also seems promising
as an account of effects of non-temporal features associated with
FP, such as the time-event correlation effect. Meanwhile, by con-
ceiving all these effects as expressions of a single implicit learning
mechanism, MTP reunites the family of phenomena in temporal
preparation (cf. Table 2).
COMPARISON TO OTHER MODELS
As noted earlier, MTP and the trace-conditioning model have
similar assumptions about the within-trial dynamics of temporal
preparation (i.e., inhibition during FP, activation at the imper-
ative moment), but dissimilar assumptions about subsequent
memory storage. The trace-conditioning model assumes that the
within-trial dynamics inﬂuence a single adjustable memory trace,
which makes it hard to account for long-term effects of FP (Los
and Agter, 2005) and their selective modiﬁcation by additional
factors (e.g., Vallesi et al., 2013). This nearsightedness of the trace-
conditioning model is solved by MTP, which assumes that old
preparatory experiences are consolidated in independent memory
traces.
Themultiple-trace assumptionof MTP is superior to the single-
trace assumption of the trace-conditioning model also from a
more general perspective of cognitive architecture. The learning
rules of the trace-conditioning model imply that highly over-
learned contingencies from the past can be completely overturned
by a few recent trials with new contingencies. This makes any sys-
tem based on old contingencies highly vulnerable to corruption,
similar to removing a foundational brick from a building (Gross-
berg, 1987). MTP solves this problem because highly over-learned
contingencies are consolidated in a multitude of memory traces,
thereby safeguarding their stable contribution to future behav-
ior. At the same time, MTP allows for ﬂexibility when addressing
novel contingencies by weighting new experiences more heavily
than older ones. However, if the new contingencies turn out to be
temporary, they will not have a strong bearing on future behav-
ior as their weight will gradually diminish, such that the more
numerous older memory traces will come to dominate again. In
all, MTP seems to strike a good balance between stability and
ﬂexibility.
It is also interesting to compare MTP to the formalized pool
model that Taatgen and Van Rijn (2011) proposed to account
for phenomena of time perception. MTP and the pool model
have similar assumptions about memory storage, but a different
take on within-trial dynamics. The pool model adopts a timing
device consisting of an accumulator that counts the number of
pulses issued by a pulse generator since the onset of a time marker
(Gibbon, 1977; see Buhusi and Meck, 2005; for a review, and
Staddon, 2005, for a critique). After each trial, the number of
pulses accumulated during FP is stored in a memory trace that
starts contributing to the timing process on subsequent trials.
Although it is conceivable that the pool model can account for
the phenomena of temporal preparation just as well as MTP can,
we postulated a different within-trial mechanism for two reasons.
First, as noted earlier, there is considerable evidence for thewithin-
trial dynamics postulated by MTP, in terms of inhibition during
FP and activation at the imperative moment (see Los, 2013 for a
review), so it makes sense to assume that these processes get rep-
resented in the memory trace. Second, it seems more in the spirit
of the multiple-trace conception to assume that memory closely
represents experience (e.g., preparation during FP) rather than
its product (e.g., a number produced by a clocking device). Of
course, these arguments are far from decisive, and future inves-
tigations may attempt to empirically distinguish between these
views.
When compared to hazard-based explanations, MTP shares
the point of view that long-term effects of temporal prepara-
tion cannot be explained as a mere propagation of short-term
effects, as implied by the trace-conditioning model. However,
beyond this general insight, the explanations differ fundamentally.
Whereas hazard-based explanations need a separate mechanism to
account for short-term effects, as elaborated in the dual-process
model (Vallesi and Shallice, 2007), MTP attributes short-term and
long-term effects to a single integrated learning mechanism at
different stages of trace-decay. From a theoretical point of view,
the position taken by MTP seems more parsimonious, because
it needs not invoke a separate mechanism to account for differ-
ent phenomena of the same family. Furthermore, whereas MTP
is conceived in terms of well-known principles of learning and
memory (e.g., Logan, 1988; Rosenbaum, 2014), the cognitive basis
of hazard-based explanations remains to be speciﬁed, in particular
with respect to how participants acquire knowledge of the hazard
function.
It may seem possible to reconcile MTP and hazard-based expla-
nations, by pointing at an apparent similarity between the hazard
function and the changing AI ratio over time. Indeed, when con-
sidering the memory traces of Figure 3, it transpires that the
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AI ratio describes preparation in a way that mimics the hazard
function. This is perhaps clearest for the exponential distribution
(Figure 3B), where the AI ratio is approximately constant across
critical moments (i.e., the proportion of red and black across
memory traces is about equal at each critical moment), consis-
tent with the constant hazard under this distribution. However,
close examination reveals that this similarity is only approximate.
The within-trial dynamics of MTP (Figure 2) imply that, as a
critical moment is more remote from S1, it suffers less from
inhibition when passed by during FP and it proﬁts more from
activation that spills over from a nearby imperative moment. As
a result, by the AI ratio alone, the RT–FP function would still
be downward sloping under the exponential distribution. It is
only because of the preponderance of repetition trials with short
FPs (where early critical moments proﬁt from high activation val-
ues stored in traces with a high weight) that the average RT–FP
function becomes ﬂat according to MTP (see also Figures 3D,F).
That is, according to MTP, the ﬂat average RT–FP function is
not a pure phenomenon, and emerges coincidentally from several
contributing inﬂuences.
Moreover, the conceptual distance between AI ratio and hazard
seems difﬁcult to bridge. Within MTP, the AI ratio summarizes
aggregated inhibition and activation across past memory traces.
Crucially, it does not accomplish anything by itself; it is the infor-
mation in the traces that drives preparation. That is, the AI ratio
is a quantity that can be conveniently used to describe the state of
preparation, but that does not play an active part in preparation at
any stage. By contrast, on hazard-based explanations, the chang-
ing hazard during FP is supposed to be the driving force behind
preparation. This means that participants must somehow derive
the hazard function from experience on past trials, for instance,
by using some mental tally system. By itself, this feat would still
not have any impact on behavior as long as the derived hazard
does not feed into a preparation process. Thus, whereas according
to hazard-based explanations temporal preparation is newly cre-
ated on each trial on the basis of changing hazard, according to
MTP it reﬂects a dynamic re-enactment of preparation as stored
in memory traces.
A CRITICAL TEST AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
To distinguish between MTP on the one hand and trace-
conditioning and hazard-based accounts on the other hand, it
would be imperative to dissociate overall trial history (the causal
force in MTP) from both recent trial history (the driving force
in trace conditioning) and current hazard (the driving force in
hazard-based explanations). One could do that by examining
transfer between blocks of trials with different FP distributions.
According to both the trace-conditioning model and hazard based
explanations, there should be hardly any transfer between blocks.
Trace-conditioning does not predict any transfer, because of its
nearsightedness. The state of conditioning is adjusted after each
trial, so it should take only a few trials to wipe out any inﬂuence
of a different preceding FP distribution. Hazard-based accounts
make the same prediction, because participants should be capable
to quickly tune in on the hazard function that applies in the new
block, especially when advance information is provided on the
FP distribution. By contrast, according to MTP, transfer between
blocks with different FP distributions should be relatively persis-
tent, because memory traces formed during one block cannot be
undone when starting a new block.
If the outcomes of a transfer study support MTP, the obvi-
ous next step would be to formalize the theory and to ﬁt it to
the variety of data patterns that have been observed in tempo-
ral preparation studies since Woodrow’s (1914) seminal study one
century ago. Apart from the family of phenomena that we consid-
ered in the present contribution, the theory should also account for
the development of temporal preparation over very brief intervals
(e.g.,Müller-Gethmann et al., 2003; Los andVander Burg,2013) as
well as for the selective modiﬁcation of short and long-term effects
of FP by additional factors. In the longer run, a more general the-
ory of timing could be pursued, which provides an integrative
perspective of phenomena in temporal preparation and time per-
ception. The close kinship of MTP and the pool model (Taatgen
and Van Rijn, 2011) inspires optimism about the feasibility of this
objective.
CONCLUSION
We have introduced a new theory of temporal preparation,
MTP, which combines the within-trial dynamics of the trace-
conditioning model (Los andVan den Heuvel, 2001) with memory
storage in multiple traces (Taatgen and Van Rijn, 2011). MTP
accounts for the family of FP phenomena (Figure 1) from a single
integrative point of view, unlike alternative accounts based on the
hazard function. Moreover, MTP has a solid cognitive basis in its
reliance on well-established principles in learning and memory.
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